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Sex in the Sexy Workplace 
Lua Kamál Yuille* 
ABSTRACT 
This article presents yet another problem that cannot be addressed adequately 
either through an honest application of existing sexual harassment paradigm under Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or through any of the solutions to that paradigm’s 
deficiencies that have been proffered since its inception: hostile environment sexual 
harassment of the non-sexualized worker in the “sexy” workplace. It offers a 
comprehensive doctrinal illustration of how both existing sexual harassment doctrine and 
popular critiques of that doctrine fail to respond to the unique case of the sexual 
harassment of a non-sexualized worker in the sexual titillation industry (e.g. a secretary 
at a pornographic magazine publisher). The article offers a doctrinal fix that draws 
inspiration from the “bona fide occupational qualification” and “business necessity 
defense” exceptions to Title VII’s prohibition on workplace discrimination. The “bona 
fide occupational requirement”	   offers a bifurcated work-related/non-work-related 
conduct analysis to provide a reasoned, if imperfect, way to narrow some of the gaps in 
hostile environment paradigm highlighted by the article’s analysis. However, rather than 
suggest that narrowing the latest gap in sexual harassment doctrine is a necessary or 
sufficient solution, the article concludes that the sexy workplace illustrates a more 
foundational problem in sexual harassment law: the sex industry is fundamentally 
incompatible with the principles of Title VII’s prohibition of gender discrimination.  
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“The rule of thumb at the end of the day is simple: sex bars can 
subordinate women, but airlines and restaurants may not.” - Katharine T. 
Bartlett1 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a woman who goes to work every day and is confronted by a supervisor 
who regularly tells explicit, “dirty” jokes. She is constantly shown pornographic 
material—nude women, graphic pictures of sex, exposed genitalia—and her male 
colleagues discuss, analyze, and joke about the material in equally graphic language. 
Pictures of nude and partially nude women are displayed throughout the workplace. 
There are even varnished, wooden plaques onto which the pictures have been affixed and 
large posters in which the pornographic material is framed. Every day, suggestive 
comments are directed at her and others: “I’d like to get in bed with that!” “Come sit on 
my lap baby!” Coworkers’ conversations center on the evaluation and grading of 
women’s bodies, and male supervisors have suggested that they are interested in having 
sexual relations with women receiving high marks. Instead of using her name, coworkers 
and supervisors will sometimes call the woman “honey,” “baby,” or other diminutives. 
She is subjected repeatedly to uninvited touching, sometimes of her buttocks.2 There is 
little doubt that the law of sexual harassment that has developed under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 would provide relief to the woman working in this work 
environment.3 
Now, consider less extreme facts. A woman finds her normal tasks supplemented 
by distasteful assignments. She is forced to act as a “look out” while the company 
president engages in extramarital liaisons with “special guests” whom she believes to be 
prostitutes. She is asked to rearrange schedules to accommodate these visits and ensure 
the president’s wife does not interrupt. During these regular liaisons, extremely loud 
noises of sexual activity and gratification emanate from his office, disrupting business 
meetings in the surrounding offices. The president also has a habit of making sexually-
charged remarks around and to the woman—asking another executive if the woman was 
the one “he was fucking”; telling a “sticky panties” joke; requesting hugs; commenting 
about the attributes of the prostitutes he invited to his office; announcing that he was 
“wearing an erection.”4 Even if the determination is less straightforward, it remains clear 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Katharine T. Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes: Dress and Appearance Standards, Community Norms, 
And Workplace Equality, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2541, 2579 (1994). 
2 This scenario borrows liberally from the facts in Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1486 
(M.D. Fla. 1991) and Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998). 
3 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1994). 
4 This hypothetical is based on the facts alleged in Raymond v. Flynt, 2010 WL 3751524 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Sept. 28, 2010), reh’g denied (Oct. 21, 2010), review denied (Dec. 15, 2010). 
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that Title VII’s prohibition of sexual harassment in the workplace also catches this 
scenario. Regardless of whether one has any legal expertise, the sexual harassment 
paradigm has so permeated public consciousness that most people intuit the (legal) 
wrongness of these sexualized scenarios in almost any workplace. 
But, imagine that the woman in question was a waitress or bartender at 
FlashDancers Gentlemen’s Club. Imagine that she was an executive assistant at Swank 
Magazine.5 Imagine that she was the telephone operator for Hot Talk or a sales manager 
for Platinum X. What if the woman was the webmaster for penthouse.com or an usher at 
Hot Flixx Theater?6 What if, in other words, the woman was working in a “sexy 
workplace”—the workplace of a business in the sexual titillation industry whose products 
or services are of a patently sexual nature—but she, herself, was a non-sexualized 
worker?7 
In the latter context, the immediate intuition raised by the two scenarios presented 
above fails. This failure raises several questions whose answers have serious 
implications. Is it likely that a court would look at the “obvious” cases above in the same 
light? Would the woman be entitled to the same protective shelter that Title VII offers to 
other “non-sexualized” workers? Should she be entitled to such protection? What would 
the overarching consequences be for sexy workplaces if she were? Considerable attention 
has been paid to these questions in evaluating the plight of the sexy worker in the sexual 
titillation industry,8 but the non-sexualized worker has been overlooked.9  
In the thirty years since courts first recognized sexual harassment as a form of sex 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 In fact, the second scenario presented above involved an executive assistant at Larry Flynt Publications, 
which publishes the well-known adult magazine, Hustler, as well as other adult content including 
Hustler.com. The president against whom the action was lodged was Larry Flynt himself. See id. 
6 The preceding are all names of actual businesses and companies in the sexual titillation industry. 
7 The term “sexy workplace contemplates both those businesses that would qualify for the so-called bona 
fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) exception to Title VII in hiring some of its workers, as well as 
businesses that do not employ any workers providing direct sexual titillation services (i.e. lap dancers, 
strippers, etc.) but where the essence of product or service is, nonetheless, sexual. 
8 See generally Ann C. McGinley, Harassing “Girls” at the Hard Rock: Masculinities in Sexualized 
Environments, 2007 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1229 (considering how Title VII rules should be applied to impose 
liability for hostile work environments created by customers in the highly sexualized environment of a Las 
Vegas casino); Ann C. McGinley, Harassment of Sex(y) Workers: Applying Title VII to Sexualized 
Industries, 18 Yale J.L. & Feminism 65 (2006) (critiquing the “good girl/bad girl” dichotomy that pervades 
consideration of hostile environment harassment claims by women in sex and sexualized industries); 
Joshua Burstein, Testing the Strength of Title VII Sexual Harassment Protection: Can it Support a Hostile 
Work Environment Claim Brought by a Nude Dancer?, 24 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 271 (1998) 
(analyzing the difficulties faced by nude dancers in proving hostile environment sexual harassment and 
suggesting a framework for providing protection); Jeannie Scalafani Rhee, Redressing for Success: the 
Liability of Hooters Restaurant for Customer Harassment of Waitresses, 20 Harv. Women’s L.J. 16 (1997) 
(proposing a framework for imposing employer liability for third-party harassment of Hooters waitresses); 
Kelly Ann Cahill, Hooters: Should There Be an Assumption of Risk Defense to Some Hostile Work 
Environment Sexual Harassment Claims?, 48 Vand. L. Rev. 1107 (1995) (analyzing employer liability for 
hostile environment harassment by customers in Hooters restaurants). See also Margot Rutman, Exotic 
Dancers’ Employment Law Regulations, 8 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 515, 531-33 (1999) 
(summarizing the difficulties in applying Title VII to exotic dancers in strip clubs). 
9 For simplicity, the terms worker and woman will be used interchangeably throughout this article. For the 
most part, however, the same or similar considerations apply with equal force to potential male victims of 
hostile work environment sexual harassment in the sexy workplace. 
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discrimination under Title VII,10 there has been a seemingly endless parade of criticisms 
from both supporters and opponents of this construal of Title VII. Such critiques are 
accompanied by proposed revisions to the law that tailor it to resolve the problems they 
highlight both through theoretical reformulations and clarifications of the underlying 
principles of the prohibition of sex discrimination and by recasting the legal elements and 
tests developed in the existing body of case law and administrative guidance.  
Notwithstanding this work, sexual harassment remains not just “a seemingly 
unending source of controversy”11 but also a seemingly intractable and evasive problem. 
Conundrums like hostile environment sexual harassment of the non-sexualized worker in 
the sexy workplace are inexorably present, resisting satisfactory resolution through an 
honest application of Title VII’s existing paradigm or through any of the solutions that 
have been proffered since its inception. Such intractability is also evidenced 
empirically.12 The available data suggests that sexual harassment has held fairly steady 
throughout the life of the law, even while its modalities have evolved. 
These questions are the descriptive and doctrinal core of this article: can the 
sexual nature of a product or service so sexualize the workplace as to provide a defense 
against the hostile work environment sexual harassment claim? Implicit in the law of sex 
discrimination is an assumption that the sexy workplace can exist. This assumption is 
evidenced, most clearly, by the bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) exception to 
Title VII’s prohibition of gender discrimination in the workplace. Courts have used the 
BFOQ exception to allow businesses the essence of whose service or products is sexual 
titillation to discriminate based on sex with regard to certain employees. The classic 
example of this special consideration is the Playboy Bunny: while at once intuitive and 
shocking in a Title VII indoctrinated society, it is long established that Playboy may hire 
only women to fill the Playboy Bunny position.13 If sexy workplaces inherently and 
unavoidably violated Title VII, they would not be entitled to such consideration. The 
question asked here, then, goes a step further. Assuming that the sexy workplace may 
exist, how much latitude does the law allow such businesses? Can the sexy workplace 
expect its workers to endure sexualized treatment or behavior that would not be permitted 
in another work environment? 
Part II of this article provides a doctrinal analysis of the sexy workplace scenario 
that illustrates the limited potential of both existing doctrine and theory to lead to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 The U.S. Supreme Court first explicitly recognized the existence of a Title VII cause of action for sexual 
harassment in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986). Before this case, however, the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission had previously promulgated guidelines having the same 
effect with which the lower federal courts complied. See, e.g., Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254-55 (4th Cir. 
1983); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982). 
11 Reva B. Siegel, Introduction: A Short History of Sexual Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT LAW 26 (Catherine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel, eds., 2004).  
12 See, e.g., EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, SEXUAL HARASSMENT STATISTICS, EEOC & 
FEPA’S COMBINED: FY 1997-FY 2011 (2012) (reporting the number of cases filed with EEOC and the state 
and local employment agencies); EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
STATISTICS, EEOC & FEPA’S COMBINED: FY 1992-FY 1996 (1997), available at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/sexual_harassment-a.cfm (last visited September 23, 
2013). 
13 See, e.g., Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 301 (N.D. Tex. 1981); Guardian Capital 
Corp. v. N.Y. State Div. of Human Rights, 46 A.D.2d 832, 833 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974) (quoting Margarita 
St. Cross v. Playboy Clubs Intl. (Appeal No. 773, Case No. CSF 22618--70)).  
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consistently satisfactory outcomes for non-sexualized workers in the sexy workplace. The 
development of sexual harassment law by the courts indicates that there is a lower 
standard of protection for non-sexualized workers in a business the essence of whose 
product or services is sexual titillation. However, unlike strippers or “Hooters’ Girls” (as 
has been argued elsewhere),14 the secretary, the sales manager, the usher, and people in 
other non-sexualized positions do not fall as easily into the unsympathetic category of 
workers who are cast as the instruments of their own mistreatment because they chose to 
make themselves the object of the sexual titillation being sold. Nevertheless, the 
standards and rules that have developed to distinguish between unlawfully discriminating 
and merely inappropriate workplace behavior have created large holes in the Title VII 
canopy such that when it rains, non-sexualized workers in the sexy workplace are likely 
to get wet.  
Part III illustrates the limited potential for existing theoretical and doctrinal 
critiques of sexual harassment to address the sexy workplace. It suggests that a change in 
the approach to hostile work environment sexual harassment, at least in this category, is 
warranted. Though concluding that no approach is capable of filling the holes in the Title 
VII canopy, a new model inspired by aspects of sex discrimination law (rather than more 
specific sexual harassment law)—the bona fide occupational qualification exception and 
the business necessity defense—provides the means of ratcheting up Title VII protection 
for non-sexualized workers in the sexy workplace. 
Part IV contemplates the broader importance of addressing the sexy workplace 
scenario, concluding that the Title VII difficulties posed by the sexy workplace evidence 
the fundamental incompatibility between such businesses and the purpose of the statute. 
I. THE DOCTRINAL INVISIBILITY OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE SEXY WORKPLACE 
Though framed by controversial academic and political discourse, the sexual 
harassment regime develops in the lives of real people. This development is pushed, 
shaped, and highlighted by contentious cases making their way to courts. A cycle of 
emerging perplexing problems not satisfactorily resolvable by the suggestions offered in 
the last round of advancement is a salient feature of this development and is integral to 
the continual reframing of the debate. The quid pro quo form of harassment, once 
accepted, became fairly easy to understand and detect.15 Hostile environment sexual 
harassment has proven more difficult. Cases of bi-sexual harassment, equal opportunity 
harassment (i.e. targets both sexes with sexual behavior),16 intersectional harassment (i.e. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Rutman, supra note 8; Burstein, supra note 8; Scalafani Rhee, supra note 8; Cahill, supra note 8. 
15 Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 Colum. L. 
Rev. 458, 460 (2001). 
16 See Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (first framing the problem). See also 
Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986) (stating equal opportunity harassment 
is not gender discrimination; Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 n.11 (11th Cir. 1982) (“Except 
in the exceedingly atypical case of a bisexual supervisor, it should be clear that sexual harassment is 
discrimination based upon sex.”); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 942 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (“Only by a 
reductio ad absurdum could we imagine a case of harassment that is not sex discrimination– where a 
bisexual supervisor harasses men and women alike.”); Raney v. District of Columbia, 892 F. Supp. 283, 
288 (D.D.C. 1995) (stating that there is no discrimination in cases where a supervisor harasses both sexes 
equally). 
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is motivated by sex and some other characteristic),17 same sex harassment,18 non-
sexualized harassment, and so forth represent significant challenges for the paradigm and 
are the factual pivots around which policy debates revolve. The sexy workplace scenario 
introduced here is an iteration of this cycle. 
A. Hypothetical Applications 
The history and purpose of Title VII is well known, but it is useful to recall 
exactly what the law prohibits: 
 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual’s…sex.19 
 
Though the prohibition of sexual harassment can be inferred from Title VII, the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s guidelines make the concept of sexual 
harassment explicit: 
 
Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation . . . of Title VII. Unwelcome 
sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical 
conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when [inter alia] 
such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an 
individual’s work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or 
offensive working environment.20 
 
From its earliest days, though, a claim of discrimination based on sexual 
harassment has never been an easy or uncontroversial means of legal protection. Women 
have always faced considerable obstacles in showing their workplace violates Title VII. 
That difficulty is both multiplied, through the delineation of particularized legal tests—
where the sexual harassment claim is based not on quid pro quo harassment but on a 
hostile environment theory—and exacerbated, by cumbersome interpretations of those 
tests.21 Even an abbreviated application of the content elements of prevailing hostile 
environment sexual harassment doctrine shows that Title VII is unlikely to give 
consistently satisfactory “coverage” to non-sexy workers in the sexy workplace. The 
obstacles presented by the core elements of a hostile environment claim make it easy to 
ignore or discount a broad range of discriminatory behavior. To illustrate, it serves to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 See generally Rachel Kahn Best, Lauren B. Edelman, Linda Hamilton Krieger, & Scott R. Eliason, 
Multiple Disadvantages: An Empirical Test of Intersectionality Theory in EEO Litigation, 45 Law & Soc’y 
Rev. 991, 992 (2011) (reviewing case statistics). 
18 See, e.g., Hilary S. Axam & Deborah Zalesne, Simulated Sodomy and Other Forms of Heterosexual 
“Horseplay:” Same Sex Sexual Harassment, Workplace Gender Hierarchies, and the Myth of the Gender 
Monolith Before and After Oncale, 11 Yale J.L. & Feminism 155, 157 (1999); Richard F. Storrow, Same-
Sex Sexual Harassment Claims After Oncale: Defining the Boundaries of Actionable Conduct, 47 Am. U.L. 
Rev. 677, 678 (1998). 
19 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a). 
20 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (2003). 
21 See, e.g., Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 839-840 (1991). 
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examine briefly the difficulties posed by the three well-known elements of the hostile 
work environment claim: (1) the contested behavior was unwelcome;22 (2) it was severe 
and pervasive;23 and (3) it was based on sex.24  
1. Unwelcomeness 
In 1986, the Supreme Court first explicitly recognized the existence of a Title VII 
cause of action for sexual harassment, pronouncing its decision in Meritor Savings Bank 
v. Vinson.25 There, the Court indicated that the “gravamen” of any sexual harassment 
claim was that the conduct was “unwelcome” and instructed lower courts to ask whether, 
in light of the nature of the contested actions and the context in which the incidents 
occurred, the claimant “by her conduct” indicated that the alleged behavior was 
unwelcome.26  
The unwelcomeness requirement is the first hurdle over which a runner, the 
sexual harassment plaintiff, must jump. Its focus on a woman’s conduct—mandated by 
Vinson’s “totality of the circumstances” analysis—has long been recognized as 
problematic, particularly because the emphasis of courts has, at times, fallen on the 
plaintiff’s dress, language, and private life.27 Nevertheless, it is clear that the “use of foul 
language or sexual innuendo in a consensual setting does not waive her legal protections 
against unwelcome harassment”28 just because courts often fixate on a woman’s dress, 
language, and private life, but fail to address the true question: whether a particular set of 
circumstances was consensual.29 
Consider the Eighth Circuit’s fairly liberal application of the unwelcomeness 
inquiry, which is representative of many other jurisdictions.30 In Burns v. McGregor, the 
court interpreted “unwelcome” to mean that the contested behavior was “uninvited and 
offensive.” 31 Accordingly, it overturned a determination that a woman, by appearing 
nude in a magazine outside of work, welcomed the sexual advances and innuendo of 
which she complained. In making its determination, it made a very important distinction:  
 
[t]he plaintiff's choice to pose for a nude magazine outside work hours is 
not material to the issue of whether plaintiff found her employer’s work-
related conduct offensive. This is not a case where Burns posed in 
provocative and suggestive ways at work. Her private life . . . did not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 69 (1986). 
23 Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). 
24 See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998). 
25 477 U.S. 57 (1986).  
26 Id. at 69. 
27 Estrich, supra note 21, at 828. See also Louise F. Fitzgerald et al., Why Didn’t She Just Report Him?, 51 
J. Soc. Issues 117, 134 (1995); Janine Benedet, Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment Claims and the 
Unwelcome Influence of Rape Law, 3 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 125 (1995).  
28 Swentek v. USAIR, Inc., 830 F.2d 552, 557 (4th Cir. 1987). 
29 See Estrich, supra note 21, at 828; Fitzgerald et al., supra note 29, at 134; Benedet, supra note 29. 
30 See, e.g., Carr v. Allison Gas Turbine Div., General Motors Corp., 32 F.3d 1007 (7th Cir. 1994); Horney 
v. Westfield Gage Co., Inc., 77 Fed. Appx. 24, 2003 WL 22326558 (1st Cir. Mass. 2003); Rahn v. Junction 
City Foundry, Inc., 152 F. Supp. 2d 1249 (D. Kan. 2001); Nuri v. PRC, Inc., 13 F. Supp. 2d 1296 (M.D. 
Ala. 1998). 
31 989 F.2d 959, 962 (8th Cir. 1993). 
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provide lawful acquiescence to unwanted sexual advances at her work 
place by her employer. To hold otherwise would be contrary to Title VII’s 
goal of ridding the work place of any kind of unwelcome sexual 
harassment.32  
 
The court’s decision suggests that sex-related conduct at work can be used to refute a 
woman’s statement that the challenged conduct was unwelcome.  
In a similar act of differentiating between the types of conduct that display 
welcomeness, a district court in the Eight Circuit determined that “[n]o female employee 
should be required to confront sexually suggestive language and noises from male 
employees, either individually or in groups.”33 Yet, it found women plaintiffs to have 
sufficiently indicated the unwelcomeness of the pervasive display of sexually oriented 
materials, use of “pet names,” and physical acts,34 only because:  
 
although [the] women . . . cursed, some freely, there was no evidence that 
women used language and epithets which were 'intensely degrading” to 
women, e.g., “bitch,” “whore”, and “cunt,” . . . . In addition, women did 
not discuss their sex lives at work in front of men, nor did they, with the 
exception of one woman on one occasion, engage in questioning men 
about their sex lives or interest in sexual activities.35  
A logical implication is that, had the women’s work behavior gone beyond the mere use 
of milder forms of foul language or had they discussed their sex lives in “mixed 
company,” their conduct could have manifested that the impugned conduct was welcome 
and, thus, not harassment.  
The undeniable tenor and sway of this more liberal contingent of cases is to 
provide protection to women even when they engage in highly sexualized behavior.36 
Despite the Eighth Circuit’s strong tone, however, these cases also make clear that not 
every female employee will be protected from sexually suggestive language, noises, and 
behavior. Under the analysis they mandate, a woman who works at a theater which shows 
pornographic films and regularly discusses the films on display with her male co-
workers, may have expressed that she welcomes touching and targeted sexual 
pantomime. 
These cases illustrate the difficulties the non-sexualized worker will face even 
under a liberal approach to unwelcomeness, especially because many courts have adopted 
similar approaches to the first prong of the hostile environment analysis.37 She may 
participate regularly in sex-related conduct at work pursuant to her job responsibilities. A 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Id. at 963. 
33 Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 824 F. Supp. 847, 880 (D. Minn. 1993). 
34 The physical acts included unwanted touching, the mock performance of oral sex on a sleeping female 
worker, and the presentation of a buffet of dildos to a woman worker. Id. at 883. 
35 Id. 
36 Indeed, reading the court’s language, it is possible to get the impression that the Eighth Circuit is 
attempting to provide relief to the woman in question without eviscerating the “unwelcomness” inquiry.  
37 See, e.g., Carr v. Allison Gas Turbine Div., General Motors Corp., 32 F.3d 1007 (7th Cir. 1994); Horney 
v. Westfield Gage Co., Inc., 77 Fed. App’x. 24 (1st Cir. 2003); Rahn v. Junction City Foundry, Inc., 152 F. 
Supp. 2d 1249 (D. Kan. 2001); Nuri v. PRC, Inc., 13 F. Supp. 2d 1296 (M.D. Ala. 1998).  
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waitress at an exotic dance venue, competing for tips with a nude woman exposing 
herself to the crowd, may dress and behave in “provocative and suggestive” ways to 
attract the attention of customers. Will such conduct prove acquiescence to sexual 
advances? A woman working at a theater where pornographic films are shown may 
regularly discuss the films on display there with her male co-workers. Will she have 
expressed that she welcomes touching and targeted sexual pantomime? 
Such obstacles are enhanced where courts have been more reluctant find that a 
woman sufficiently manifested her opposition. For example, the Seventh Circuit credited 
the following claims of a woman jailer: 
she was handcuffed to the drunk tank and sally port doors . . . physically 
hit and punched in the kidneys, that her head was grabbed and forcefully 
placed in members laps, and that she was the subject of lewd jokes and 
remarks . . . that she had chairs pulled out from under her, a cattle prod 
with an electrical shock was placed between her legs, and that they 
frequently tickled her. She was placed in a laundry basket, handcuffed 
inside an elevator, handcuffed to the toilet and her face pushed into the 
water, and maced.38  
It is difficult to imagine that any course of conduct could have manifested the 
welcomeness or, conversely, failed to manifest the unwelcomeness of such patently 
criminal abuse.39 Nevertheless, the jailer was denied relief. The Court considered the 
woman a “willing and welcome participant” in the behavior who “relished reciprocating 
in kind” because she had been placed on probation for using offensive language, had 
been reprimanded for not wearing a bra to work, enjoyed showing her abdominal scars to 
coworkers, and had participated in suggestive gift giving.40  
Adopting a similarly restrictive interpretation of the unwelcomeness requirement, 
an Eleventh Circuit court denied relief for what one woman claimed was a hostile 
environment created by sexual overtures, direct propositions, genital exposure, and 
sexual touching because she had participated in sexual banter, back scratching, and sitting 
on laps.41 This woman’s direct expressions of unwelcomeness were deemed insufficient 
because “when she did tell him ‘no,’ she also said such things as ‘I’m busy,’ or ‘not 
now,’ comments which tend to negate the effect of the initial ‘no,’ making her intentions 
less than clear.”42 What possible conduct in this situation could evidence that escalated 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484, 486 (7th Cir. 1991).  
39 The plaintiff testified that “[i]t was important for me to be a police officer and if that was the only way 
that I could be accepted.” As a result, she did not complain about the conduct upon which she based her 
claim. In fact, the witnesses testified that “Reed reveled in the sexual horseplay, instigated a lot of it, and 
had ‘one of the foulest mouths’ in the department.” 
40 Id. at 486-87. 
41 Mangrum v. Republic Industries, Inc., 260 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1252-53 (N.D. Ga. 2003), aff’d 88 F.App’x. 
390 (11th Cir. 2003). 
42 Id. In Mangrum, the plaintiff, a used car salesperson, had alleged that once her colleague was promoted 
he “asked her for oral sex, said that she could make more money on her car sales if she would accept his 
sexual overtures, sexually propositioned Plaintiff's daughter in front of Plaintiff… patted her buttocks, and, 
on one occasion, exposed himself to her.” Before these actions, however, the plaintiff had participated in 
office sexual banter, used foul language, sat on the laps of colleagues, scratched their backs, and allowed 
her back to be scratched. To the court, such anachronistic behavior acted as a general waiver. 
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sexual conduct was unwelcome? The only logical conclusion based on this stricter route 
is that, if any conduct is welcome, then no conduct (within some limits) is unwelcome.  
At either pole, prevailing sexual harassment doctrine leaves all sexual harassment 
claimants at a disadvantage.43 However, the totality of the circumstances analysis 
presents additional obstacles for non-sexy workers in the sexy workplace. For example, 
as the illustrative cases discussed above show, the status of work-related sexual 
conversation or behavior is unclear. Is it evidence that a woman welcomes or invites non-
work-related behavior? Even more basically, what constitutes work-related behavior? 
The real difficulty lies in drawing the lines. What if a woman was constantly shown 
pornographic material because she was a copy editor at Hustler XXX magazine? Maybe 
she participated in the graphic discussions about the material with male colleagues. She 
may even have done so eagerly. All of the cases above permit sexual conduct at work— 
especially enthusiastic conduct—to evidence that the woman was not offended by or 
unreceptive to the acts of her colleagues. Mangrum even recognizes, frankly, that a 
woman’s express statement that conduct is unwelcome is insufficient to manifest the 
unwelcomeness of harassment if her behavior otherwise indicates welcomeness under the 
rubric the court lays out.  
Another problem presented by the unwelcomeness inquiry is its inordinate focus 
on the type of language used by the claimant. Where the plaintiff was unsuccessful, 
reference to her frequent use of vulgar language is almost always a factor in proving that 
she failed to manifest adequately the unwelcomeness of the harassing conduct. Even 
while recognizing that cursing is not an invitation to sexual harassment,44 cases finding 
sexual behavior to be unwelcome noted the mild or limited nature of the language used 
by the victim.  
What if, however, the woman works in an adult video or bookstore? In many sexy 
workplaces, vulgar and offensive language, even profanity that is “intensely degrading” 
to women, is widely used by women and men alike and forms part of the trade 
vernacular.45 Similarly, in an environment inherently pervaded by sexuality, it may be 
common to discuss one’s personal sex life. It would not be shocking (or offensive) for the 
employees of a sporting goods company to discuss their opinions of the different brands 
of tennis rackets based on their personal experiences with the rackets in various matches. 
The same intuition should hold if the woman works for Doc Johnson Sextoys. Is it 
unimaginable that individuals who sell sexual stimulation products will discuss their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 The problems presented by the welcomeness requirement have been well chronicled elsewhere: Elsie 
Mata, Title VII Quid Pro Quo and Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment Claims: Changing the Legal 
Framework Courts Use to Determine Whether Challenged Conduct Is Unwelcome, 34 U. Mich. J.L. 
Reform 791 (2001); Benedet, Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment Claims and the Unwelcome 
Influence of Rape Law, 3 Mich. J. Gender & L. 125, 174 (1995); Susan Deller Ross, Proving Sexual 
Harassment: The Hurdles, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1451 (1992); Joan S. Weiner, Understanding Unwelcomeness 
in Sexual Harassment Law: Its History and a Proposal for Reform, 72 Notre Dame L. Rev. 621, 626-28 
(1997); Mary F. Radford, By Invitation Only: The Proof of Welcomeness in Sexual Harassment Cases, 72 
N.C. L. Rev. 499 (1994).  
44 E.g., Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 824 F. Supp. 847, 883 (D. Minn. 1993). (“That women say ‘f…’ at 
work does not imply that they are inviting any and every form of sexual harassment.”). 
45 For example, the titles of numerous adult films include terms that would generally be considered vulgar. 
While Playboy employs somewhat mild language, magazines like Hustler or Swank freely employ 
extremely sexually graphic words. 
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opinions of those products in the same way the sporting goods employees do?46 In both 
instances, the woman working in the sexy workplace, by engaging in this normal 
workplace conduct, would jeopardize her protection against serious sex-based abuse 
under Title VII. 
Most damaging is the implication that some willing sexualized conduct is a 
license for much more serious sexual harassment. The plaintiff in Reed may have, for 
example, given vulgar presents, but is that really reason to assume she consented to 
physical abuse? Similarly, the plaintiff in Mangrum sat on men’s laps and scratched their 
backs. By doing so, did she invite them to request oral sex or expose themselves to her? 
Again, such assumptions will work against the claims of women in all fields who chose 
to participate in some sexuality at work. However, women who are not in the sexy 
workplace can avoid sexual behavior to preserve their legal remedies.47 A woman in the 
sexy workplace may be unable to fulfill her job requirements without using some foul 
language, talking graphically about sex, or otherwise “contribut[ing] to creation of a 
sexually charged environment.”48  
If the idea that a woman would be required to behave in such ways seems 
unrealistic, consider the following statement of an employee of MyPleasure.com, an 
online adult toy company: “[t]here is no place else in the world where I could be sitting in 
my office and hear, ‘Has anyone seen the pink dong with the enormous balls?’”49 Similar 
issues would be faced by the employees in adult bookstores and theaters; the names of 
films and books (as well as the companies that produce them) are often explicit, and even 
a basic description of the material can be fairly graphic. Precedent supports a court 
concluding that, having used this graphic language, a woman must be interpreted to have 
said, “Please ask me for sexual favors” or “I don’t object to physical abuse of a sexual 
nature.”  
The unwelcomeness analysis also raises this litmus issue: is accepting a job in a 
sexualized environment itself conduct that negates evidence of unwelcomeness? That is, 
does accepting a job in the sexy workplace indicate that a woman welcomes sexualized 
behavior and conversation? If provocative dress, dirty language, and vulgarity can be 
sufficient proof of welcomeness, it seems that actively seeking and, then, accepting a 
position the individual knows will be rife with sex and sexuality could be legally 
sufficient to indicate receptivity to a broad range of sexual behavior.  
No courts have dealt with this question, but there is evidence that they might 
construe acceptance of a certain type of job as manifestation of welcomeness. For 
example, the Supreme Court has recognized that the nature of the job is an aspect of a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 The currently popular sex toy parties being organized by companies like Passion Parties or Edible 
Ecstasy most certainly require “sex-party consultants” to participate in many explicit conversation in order 
to be good sales people. See Heather Morgan, Our Parties, Ourselves: The Next Generation’s Avon Lady Is 
Calling—With Dildos and Lube! Ring Up Your Girlfriends, TIME OUT NEW YORK, Oct. 2003, at 28.  
47 Whether or not a woman should be forced to avoid any or all sexual behavior in the workplace in order to 
be protected by the prohibition on sexual harassment under Title VII is debatable. However, that concern is 
not the subject of the current discussion. It suffices here to emphasize that women in the non-sexy 
workplace have the option to desexualize their behavior, which may not be available to the woman in the 
sexy workplace. 
48 Brassfield v. Jack McLendon Furniture, Inc., 953 F. Supp. 1438, 1450 (M.D. Ala. 1996). 
49 Trisha Hurlburt, “So, What Do You Do?” The Inside Scoop on Working for a Sex Toy Company, 
MYPLEASURE.COM, http://www.mypleasure.com/education/sexed/working_for_a_sex_toy_company.asp 
(last visited September 23, 2013). 
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sexual harassment claim.50 Using that rationale, the Court denied a Title VII claim 
because “[t]he ordinary terms and conditions of [her] job required her to review the 
sexually explicit statement” that formed the basis of the suit.51 A California court echoed 
the same rationale, finding “the nature of the work being performed is a factor to consider 
in evaluating the context of the alleged sexual harassment.”52  
Such language could be read broadly to mean that, by accepting certain jobs or 
jobs in certain industries, a person welcomes the behavior she claims was harassing. 
Since unwelcomeness is shown only when an employee neither solicits nor incites the 
impugned behavior,53 a strong defense is that, by accepting a job in the sexy workplace, a 
woman “requested” or “roused” at least some sexual conduct. At first, this assertion 
seems asinine, but consider a different example. By accepting a job at a school, a teacher 
may be said, uncontroversially, to have requested that the school assign students to her 
and engage in at least some pedagogical conduct. Similarly, a woman who accepts a job 
filling the orders received by a company that distributes adult paraphernalia may be said 
to have requested that the company expose her to a wide variety of sexual devices and (at 
least some) discussion of them. Based on prevailing interpretations, courts would then be 
perfectly reasonable to conclude that, having invited such exposure and discussion, the 
woman opened the door to a wide range of sexualized conduct unrelated to the narrow 
scope of sexual conduct that could be deemed part and parcel of her job. 
2. Severe and Persuasive 
The next hurdle in the race toward a Title VII victory is that the allegedly 
harassing behavior must be “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the 
victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.”54 It serves as a de 
minimis test, embedding an analysis of subjective and objective work expectations. If the 
victim does not subjectively perceive the environment to be abusive, there cannot have 
been any actionable alteration in the conditions of employment.55 Additionally, the 
conduct must be of the kind that a reasonable person would have considered hostile.56 In 
Oncale v. Sundower Offshore Services, Inc., the Supreme Court explained that this 
“common sense” inquiry into the severity of harassment “requires careful consideration 
of the social context in which particular behavior occurs and is experienced by its 
target.”57 It should be obvious that the victim of sexual harassment in the sexy workplace 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903 (11th Cir. 1982). 
51 Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986). 
52 Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Prod., 117 Cal. App. 4th 1164 (2004), review granted and opinion 
superseded sub nom. Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Prod., 94 P.3d 476 (Cal. 2004). In Lyle, the court 
determined that the inquiry regarding the “nature” of the employment is relevant to the “severe or 
pervasive” prong of the sexual harassment claim, which will be discussed below. Nothing in the Supreme 
Court’s language necessitates that conclusion or discourages courts from taking the nature of the 
employment into account at all stages of the inquiry.  
53 Henson, 682 F.2d at 903 (“In order to constitute harassment, this conduct must be unwelcome in the 
sense that the employee did not solicit or incite it, and in the sense that the employee regarded the conduct 
as undesirable or offensive”). 
54 Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). 
55 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81-82 (1998). 
56 Dey v. Colt Const. & Development Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1449-1450 (7th Cir. 1994). 
57 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81-82.  
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would encounter difficulty in proving either sides of the severe and pervasive 
requirement.  
The same credibility issues that dilute evidence of unwelcomeness negate claims 
of subjective perception of hostility. Regardless of whether a reasonable person would 
consider working conditions to be substantively altered if the workplace were pervaded 
by overtly sexual comments like “girls are only good for one thing,” “there is a girl in my 
office going down on me,” or “[I] would eat [her] no matter how [she] smelled,”58 a 
negative reaction may seem incredulous from, say, the set dresser on pornographic film. 
It is easy to believe that an accountant at Google would be subjectively dismayed by the 
extensive posting of explicit calendars with nude women featured in every month, “a 
picture in which a nude woman was bending over with a buttocks and genitals exposed to 
view,”59 or “a picture of a woman’s pubic area with a meat spatula pressed on it.”60 But, 
courts might intuit that a fetish toy assembler would not be. More likely, the court would 
find that, at most, she “experienced th[e] depravity with amazing resilience,”61 thereby 
defeating her claim.  
The subjectivity requirement can be seen as a particularly effective gatekeeper 
filtering frivolous or abusive claims.62 The possibility that courts may intuit that a person 
who accepted a job in a sexy workplace was not subjectively bothered by the sexually 
charged work conditions would ensure that only women with genuine claims sought Title 
VII redress. But, however attractive an outcome this may be, there is reason to believe 
that such an intuition insufficiently approximates universal truth. For example, one 
woman, described the environment of the strip club where she worked as differing from 
her expectations, explaining, “You feel like you’re just a piece of meat…it’s like pick 
which piece looks best.”63 Certainly some non-sexy workers might experience the same 
discomfort. Indeed, the complainant in the only reported hostile environment sexual 
harassment case involving a non-sexy worker in the sexy workplace reported being 
“disgusted” by the presence of sex toys in the offices of a Larry Flynt company, which in 
addition to publishing Hustler Magazine sells such toys.64  
Moreover, the court’s intuition would sound very similar to the district court’s 
determination overruled in McGregor.65 There, the district judge noted that the plaintiff 
twice appeared nude in Paisano Publications66 magazines, and in the photographs “she 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1495-99 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (describing in detail 
the various pornographic material on display). 
59 Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484, 486 (7th Cir. 1991). 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Cf., E. Christi Cunningham, Preserving Normal Heterosexual Male Fantasy: The “Severe or Pervasive” 
Missed-Interpretation of Sexual Harassment in the Absence of A Tangible Job Consequence, 1999 U. Chi. 
Legal F. 199 (1999) (arguing that the severe or pervasive standard constitutes a reification of sex inequality 
in the workplace). 
63 Burstein, supra note 8, at 274. 
64 Raymond v. Flynt, 2010 WL 3751524 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2010)., reh’g denied (Oct. 21, 2010), 
review denied (Dec. 15, 2010). 
65 Burns v. McGregor, 989 F.2d 959, 963-64 (8th Cir. 1993). 
66 Paisano publishes motorcycle magazines for men. As its website described, “[e]very issue features the 
best custom bikes, babes, runs, true road tales and madcap humor.” See EASYRIDERS, available at 
http://www.paisanopub.com/easyriders/index2.cfm (last visited September 23, 2013). While employed at 
McGregor, Burns appeared in Paisano’s flagship magazine, Easyriders, which features nude models posing 
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had ornaments or earrings attached to her nipples. One picture revealed a tatoo [sic] in the 
pelvic region.”67 These facts regarding the plaintiff’s character demonstrated that 
“testimony that she was offended by sexually directed comments and Penthouse or 
Playboy pictures [wa]s not credible.”68 As compelling as the district court’s intuition may 
have been, it was unfair. Obviously, what may or may not offend one in her private life is 
inapposite to determine what offends that same person at work. In the same way, 
permitting courts to follow such instincts for non-sexualized workers in the sexy 
workplace would create an unfair, de facto bar to a plaintiff’s claim. Not only could 
performing her job become character evidence rendering her testimony less credible, but 
use of that evidence would not be prohibited by the precedents set in cases like 
McGregor because the behavior would have occurred at work.69 
The objective prong of the severe and pervasive analysis considers whether a 
reasonable person would find that sexual conduct in an inherently sexualized atmosphere 
changed the terms and conditions of her employment. It also puts the non-sexy worker in 
a bind. First, accounts from within the sexy workplace weigh against her. One exotic 
dancer explained, “I work in an environment that invites what could be called sexual 
harassment from almost everyone in the workplace: customers, managers, bouncers, 
even, in many cases, other dancers.”70 Stating that it would be “ridiculous” to bring a 
sexual harassment suit, she continued that some “behaviors are clearly more acceptable in 
a strip club than in, say, a newsroom . . . if a bouncer or DJ tells me I have a great ass I’m 
not likely to take offense . . . . A lot of friendly sexual banter in our club helps keep the 
atmosphere charged.”71  
It is not only sexualized workers who feel that the sexual nature of their 
workplace necessarily invites behaviors with which they are comfortable but that others 
could consider harassment. In the editorial department of a pornographic magazine, 
individuals frequently discussed the sexual content of the magazine, as well as their own 
personal experiences, yet, the employees did not seem bothered by this behavior. One 
employee reported:  
 
There’s very little sexual harassment that does go on . . . . I mean, that’s 
not to say, I don’t observe like “Troglodytes speaking coarsely with their 
women.” . . . . There’s a couple of guys that roam around the office that 
are real sort of pigs, and classic male chauvinists, but because the 
company is so upwardly mobile, it’s just sort of like, “Ahh, he’s just a 
retrograde.” 72 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
on bikes, as well as its “lifestyle” magazine, In the Wind, which features nude photographs submitted by 
readers. Burns v. McGregor Electronic Industries, Inc., 807 F. Supp. 506, 512 (N.D.Iowa,1992). Both 
magazines include nude or partially nude women on virtually every page. 
67Burns, 807 F. Supp. at 512. 
68 Id. at 509, 514. 
69 See supra note 21 and accompanying text. Estrich discusses more fully the difficulties credibility 
questions cause in the general field of sexual harassment. Such difficulties, as discussed here, are 
exacerbated in the sexy workplace. Estrich, supra note 21, at 847-58. 
70 Burstein, supra note 8, at 299. 
71 Id. 
72 Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061, 2148 (2003). 
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In the same way, an employee of MyPleasure.com described what would be 
evidence of sexual harassment in most other contexts as a positive characteristic of the 
work environment, saying, “I mean, honestly, we have lube in our candy jar and a clock 
made of vibrators, but that’s part of what makes working here so great.”73 She seemed to 
feel such behavior was part of the job, stating, “you have to realize that going into a line 
of work such as this. You are dealing with sex, and people who are having sex . . . and 
people who want to improve their experiences with sex—what I’m getting at is that you 
can’t get away from sex as the bottom line.”74  
These examples do not evidence that every non-sexualized worker welcomes the 
sexual behavior that will almost always pervade the sexy workplace or that non-
sexualized workers believe that such behavior should not give rise to sexual harassment 
claims.75 Nevertheless, it supports the strong presumption that disfavors the victim 
seeking redress. Furthermore, special differentiated standards like the “reasonable 
woman” or the “reasonable victim,” which have been promoted by various courts and 
scholars in order to concentrate on the perspective of women rather than men,76 would do 
little to make the standard of proof less burdensome for the employee of the sexy 
workplace. All of the statements related above were made by women working in sexy 
workplaces. 
Evidence suggesting that a reasonable person may conclude that sexuality is part 
of the terms and conditions of employment in the sexy workplace is compounded by 
Oncale, which seems to foreclose the possibility altogether by linking the reasonableness 
standard to the type of workplace:  
A professional football player’s working environment is not severely or 
pervasively abusive . . . if the coach smacks him on the buttocks as he 
heads onto the field—even if the same behavior would reasonably be 
experienced as abusive by the coach’s secretary…back at the office. The 
real social impact of workplace behavior often depends on a constellation 
of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships which are 
not fully captured by a simple recitation of the words used or the physical 
acts performed.77 
Just as a football player’s workplace will not be rendered hostile by certain types of 
conduct seen to “come with the territory,” explicit sexual language and imagery, 
regardless of whether it is degrading or insulting, come with the territory of the sex 
titillation industry. The sexually charged circumstances, the clear expectations of 
sexuality, and the unambiguously sexual aspect of relationships between individuals will 
each prescribe a heightened standard for determining the objective reasonability of a 
woman’s discomfort with the impugned conduct.  
Taken together, these considerations seem to indicate that protections of Title VII, 
though arguably displaying serious deficiencies in the protection of the victims of sexual 
harassment, in general, create a standard of proof that, indirectly, progressively defines 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Hurlburt, supra note 49. 
74 Id. 
75 See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text. 
76 Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 672 (9th Cir. 1991). 
77 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81-82 (1998). 
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workers in the sexy workplace out of the sphere of possible hostile environment 
claimants. 
3. Because of Sex 
The final element of a hostile environment sexual harassment claim—that the 
contested behavior was predicated on her sex—is the linchpin of sexual harassment law’s 
anti-discrimination hinge. This “because of sex” element requires a motivational or 
causation inquiry.78 It constitutes a uniquely high hurdle for employees of the sexy 
workplace because the nature of those businesses makes the motivation for the conduct 
impossible to assume and  hard to determine.  
Under the prevailing approach to sexual harassment law, referred to derisively as 
the sexual desire-dominance paradigm,79 courts assume the “because of sex” requirement 
is met whenever the contested behavior is sexual in nature.80 As the court in McGregor 
explained, “sexual behavior directed at a woman [by a man] raises the inference that the 
harassment is based on her sex.”81 Whatever its merits or demerits,82 the approach is 
inapposite where the workplace is inherently sexualized. Unlike the first woman police 
officer,83 or the only woman operator in a shoe production shop,84 the first woman 
working for Phallix Manufacturers simply cannot assume that the pervasive sexual 
conduct in the sex toy plant is aimed either at excluding her or maintaining a sex 
segregated workplace.  
Since the motive cannot be assumed, courts will subject the sexy workplace case 
to a motive inquiry. In other words, a victim must actually prove the contested actions 
were based on sex. Once the motivation inquiry is triggered, “sex” is taken to mean not 
sex (i.e. sexual activity) but gender (the focus of Title VII’s anti-discriminatory purpose). 
Courts have been satisfied with evidence that shows “gender is a substantial factor in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 See generally Kelly Cahill Timmons, Sexual Harassment and Disparate Impact: Should Non-Targeted 
Workplace Sexual Conduct Be Actionable Under Title VII?, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1152, 1154 (2003); David S. 
Schwartz, When Is Sex Because of Sex? The Causation Problem in Sexual Harassment Law, 150 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1697, 1699 (2002); William C. Sung, Taking the Fight Back to Title VII: A Case for Redefining 
“Because of Sex” to Include Gender Stereotypes, Sexual Orientation, and Gender Identity, 84 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 487, 489 (2011); Ann C. McGinley, Creating Masculine Identities: Bullying and Harassment 
“Because of Sex,” 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1151, 1156 (2008); Ann C. McGinley, !Viva La Evolucion!: 
Recognizing Unconscious Motive in Title VII, 9 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 415, 416 (2000). 
79 The term “desire-dominance” paradigm was first used by Vicki Schultz. Vicki Schultz, 
Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 Yale L.J. 1683, passim (1998). It has been widely adopted, see, 
e.g., Ann C. McGinley, supra note 78, at 1152.  
80 See, e.g., Kristin H. Berger Parker, Ambient Harassment Under Title VII: Reconsidering the Workplace 
Environment, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 945, 956 (2008) (providing a thorough summary of the evolution of the 
“because of sex” requirement); David S. Schwartz, When Is Sex Because of Sex? The Causation Problem in 
Sexual Harassment Law, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1697, 1719 (2002) (offering a detailed analysis of the 
requirement). However, the “based on” or “because of” sex requirement attaches to every claim of hostile 
work environment sexual harassment. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80. 
81 McGregor, 955 F.2d 564. 
82 Schultz, among others, has criticized this tendency—the “sexual desire-dominance paradigm” and the 
disaggregation of sexual conduct from other discriminatory behavior—as a significant deficiency in sexual 
harassment law, which makes it insensitive to the wider range of sex discrimination that occurs in non-
sexual forms of harassment. See Schultz, supra note 79, at 1692-1755. 
83 Mancini v. Township of Teaneck, 794 A.2d 185 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002). 
84 Ocheltree v. Scollon Productions, Inc., 335 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 2003). 
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disparate treatment, and that if the plaintiff had been a man she would not have been 
treated in the same manner.”85  
Even assuming a non-sexy worker is subject to different treatment, proving 
motive may be exceedingly difficult because alternative motivations are easily 
identifiable. McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, a Fourth Circuit same-sex 
harassment case illustrates the difficulty.86 There, finding incredible the claim that a man 
had been sexually harassed by heterosexual males,87 the court posited the following 
explanations for the ruthless behavior exhibited by the victim’s co-workers: 
 
Perhaps “because of” the victim’s known or believed prudery, or shyness, 
or other form of vulnerability to sexually-focused speech or conduct. 
Perhaps “because of” the perpetrators’ own sexual perversion, or 
obsession, or insecurity. Certainly, “because of” their vulgarity and 
insensitivity and meanness of spirit. But not specifically “because of” the 
victim’s sex.88 
 
The type of reasoning employed by the Fourth Circuit would be attractive in cases 
where courts seek some alternative motivation for the inappropriate conduct of which the 
plaintiff complains. In some clear sense, the claim of a sexy workplace employee is very 
susceptible to a McWilliams-type argument. It would not be difficult for a court to 
conclude that sexually-oriented acts of a worker in the sexy workplace were, 
fundamentally, based on some obsession or insensitivity on the part of the harasser. 
Simpler still, maybe the harasser’s behavior was triggered by the sexually charged nature 
of the workplace itself. Maybe the woman was targeted for her dislike of certain 
sexualized activities, which is seen as preposterous given her choice of the sexy 
workplace. Maybe the use of obscene language was unintentional, benign mimicry of the 
products being sold in the workplace. Maybe this. Maybe that. There are numerous very 
plausible explanations for harassing behavior that, in the sexy workplace, provide 
comfortable and potentially persuasive alternatives to a finding of gender animus. 
A wealth of academic and practical literature has analyzed the difficulties 
presented by the “because of sex” requirement of sexual harassment canon. Such work 
generally concludes that, even if such a requirement is essential to an anti-discrimination 
framework, as construed it has the effect of rendering invisible a potentially large 
quantity of discrimination. That erasure seems to shield all but the most egregious case of 
sexual harassment in the sexy workplace. 
B. Some Favorable Precedent 
The obstacles that the three elements of a hostile environment claim present make 
it easy to ignore or discount a broad range of potentially discriminatory and harmful 
behavior. Nevertheless, there are indications from the only two reported cases involving 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1047 (3d Cir. 1977). 
86 72 F.3d 1191, 1196 (4th Cir. 1996). 
87 Note that the Supreme Court’s decision in Oncale overturned the Fourth Circuit’s holding that same-sex 
harassment was only a viable claim for sex discrimination where the perpetrator was homosexual. 
However, the reasoning highlighted here remains illustrative. 
88 McWilliams 72 F.3d at 1196. 
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non-sexualized workers in sexy workplaces that, in the most egregious cases, the worker 
in the sexy workplace would not be without remedy.  
In a 1990 case involving the sexual harassment claims of a Penthouse Pet against 
the company, a New York court held that the: 
 
offensiveness of defendants’ conduct [wa]s not mitigated by the fact that 
plaintiff’s job as a model and actress for Penthouse involved, in part, the 
commercial exploitation of her physical appearance . . . . The fact that 
plaintiff accepted employment which exploited her sexuality does not 
constitute a waiver of her right to be free from sexual harassment in the 
workplace.89  
 
Thoreson’s broad holding would seem to work in favor of the worker in the sexy 
workplace. If sexy workers in the sexy workplace do not lose their rights to be free from 
sexual harassment, non-sexualized workers will certainly be afforded the same level of 
protection. However, Thoreson involved quid pro quo harassment, and the court placed 
significant emphasis on the similarity of the defendant’s behavior—forcing the plaintiff 
to have sex with investors—to sexual slavery.90 The court made no intimation that other 
forms of “verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature” could arise to the level of abuse 
necessary to violate the law in the case of the Penthouse Pet.  
The more prominent of the two reported cases of non-sexualized workers in a 
sexy workplace, Schonauer v. DCR Entertainment,91 is similarly ambiguous. In denying 
summary judgment to the defendant, the court explained how the plaintiff could prove 
either hostile work environment or quid pro quo sexual harassment based on a 
Washington statute identical to Title VII. Though the court found that the evidence 
presented was sufficient for a jury to find either type of harassment, the proffered facts 
resembled the type of quid pro quo demands presented in Thoreson.  
The plaintiff, Schonauer, was hired at Fox’s Topless Entertainment as a “beverage 
server” rather than as a topless dancer. Nonetheless, she was constantly pressured to 
participate in the club’s “All Nude Review,” a weekly nude waitress contest. The 
behavior about which Schonauer complained included being asked on several occasions 
to complete an information card as a part of the contest that asked personal questions of a 
sexual nature. In one instance, as one of the club’s managers tried to persuade Schonauer 
to participate in the contest, he put his arm around her. When Schonauer would refuse to 
participate in the contest, the manager would glare at her or otherwise become angry. The 
only behavior she alleged that was not related to Fox’s attempts to convince her to appear 
nude was the intrusive behavior of one manager who “had a habit of regularly entering 
into the women’s bathroom/locker/dressing room area.” After one month of consistently 
refusing to perform nude, Schonauer was fired.92 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Thoreson v. Penthouse Intern., Ltd., 563 N.Y.S.2d 968, 976 (N.Y. Sup. 1990). 
90 Id. at 977 (“Conduct of the sort committed by defendants represents the quintessential violation of our 
constitutionally-based relational norms of equality. Defendants used the plaintiff in furtherance of their 
business as if she were property owned by them. Although the plaintiff's employment enabled the 
defendants indirectly to profit from her physical appearance and acting abilities, it did not render her a 
commodity to be leased, sold, traded or exploited because of her womanhood.”). 
91 Schonauer v. DCR Entertainment, Inc., 905 P.2d 392 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995). 
92 Id. at 396-397. 
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The limited value of Schonauer is evident. Apart from the fact that the court did 
not decide the merits of the case, it is far from clear that it would have held that the facts 
could support a verdict of hostile environment sexual harassment if the persistent 
behavior of which the plaintiff complained had not also been quid pro quo demands of 
sexual or sexualized activity:  
 
A jury could reasonably infer that [the managers’] conduct created a 
hostile and offensive work environment. According to [Schonauer], she 
wished only to wait tables . . . . [The managers] nonetheless pressured her, 
repeatedly and intentionally, to provide fantasized sexual information and 
to dance on stage in sexually provocative ways . . . . [This situation] 
arguably created a hostile working environment for someone hired to wait 
tables, and the hostile and offensive nature of that environment was 
arguably intensified by [the manager’s] intrusions into the women’s 
dressing room and bathroom.93  
 
In the absence of the particular hybrid facts of this case, courts will likely fall 
back on the general analyses of hostile work environment claims presented above. And, 
the result will be less favorable to plaintiffs because the questions asked and evidence 
required by courts to determine whether a claimant has proved her allegation of 
harassment will make it nearly impossible for the non-sexualized worker in the sexy 
workplace to prevail in a Title VII action.  
The upshot of the preceding discussion is familiar in sexual harassment discourse. 
The difficulties in establishing the required elements of a hostile work environment claim 
make it easy to dismiss conduct that is discriminatory within the meaning of Title VII as 
inconsequential solely because the conduct occurred in the sexy workplace. This is the 
case even though such behavior can be as discriminatory and harmful as the same 
behavior in non-sexually charged environments, if not more so.94 Despite indications 
from Thoreson and Schonauer that, in the most egregious (i.e. quid pro quo) cases, the 
worker in the sexy workplace could successfully claim Title VII protection, as 
implemented today, the law of sexual harassment will not protect the non-sexualized 
worker in the sexy workplace from the broader range of behavior against which Title VII 
protects other women.  
In short, Title VII and sexual harassment case law does not provide sexy 
workplace employers with an explicit affirmative defense to hostile work environment 
claims. In fact, what is available suggests that the sexy workplace is equally subject to the 
scrutiny of Title VII as any other business. However, the relevant hostile environment 
tests work as an implicit defense of just that sort. An employer in the sexual titillation 
industry has wide latitude to argue that, even if everything a woman claims were true, (1) 
the conduct was not unwelcome because it was naturally associated with working in a 
sexually charged atmosphere indicate welcomeness; (2) the conduct was not severe or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Id. at 400. 
94 For example, Anne McGinley attributes the tendency for women in Las Vegas casinos to be seen as 
sexually available to male patrons and employees to factors not generally present in non-sexualized 
workplaces. Ann C. McGinley, Trouble in Sin City: Protecting Sexy Workers' Civil Rights, 23 Stan. L. & 
Pol'y Rev. 253, 268-269 (2012). 
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pervasive because a reasonable person would not find sexual conversation and touching 
hostile in a sexy workplace; and/or (3) the conduct was not based on sex because the 
alleged discriminatory behavior was motivated, instead, by the sexualized nature of the 
work.  
II. SEARCHING FOR ALTERNATIVES 
One court explained that a “[h]ostile work environment is characterized by a 
workplace pervaded with sexual slur, insult and innuendo, verbal sexual harassment, or 
extremely vulgar and offensive sexually related epithets.”95 But, the sexy workplace may 
be necessarily or un-antagonistically characterized by just those qualities. A sexual 
harassment paradigm so parochially construed cannot provide adequate protection of 
women working in the sexy workplace. If the predictions made above are accurate, a new 
approach to the sexual harassment of non-sexualized workers in the sexy workplace is 
necessary.  
A. Insufficiency of Existing Solutions 
Of course, to cast the plight of the non-sexy worker in the sexy workplace as 
intractable by reference to enforceable doctrine alone is to raise a house of cards. 
Volumes of critiques suggesting significant modifications to that doctrine have been 
written and not implemented. It is possible that an adequate approach lies within this 
work, so it serves to address the most likely contenders.  
The most obvious candidates are the risk approaches to sexual harassment, which 
consider whether women who voluntarily put themselves in situations where there is a 
heightened likelihood of potentially discriminatory sexualized conduct should be 
afforded the same protection as women who do not make that inherently risky decision. 
Generally, these approaches conclude that they should not and maintain that the equality 
afforded by Title VII can only be effectively and reasonably achieved if women, viewed 
as responsible actors, are held accountable for the decisions they make. In what has 
become the standard text on the subject, Kelly Ann Cahill argues that employers of 
sexualized workers in sexy workplaces like Hooters Restaurants should have the 
opportunity to prove that, by accepting a certain job, the employee consented to hostile 
environment-type sexual harassment.96Another approach aligned with the view that 
workers in the sexy workplace should not receive the same Title VII protection given to 
other workers is the proposal of Robert Aalberts and Lorne Seidman to locate jobs along 
a spectrum of risk.97 “High risk occupations” (e.g. topless dancer) would permit 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Walker v. Sullair Corp., 736 F. Supp. 94, 100 (W.D.N.C. 1990), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 146 F.2d 888 
(4th Cir. 1991). 
96 Cahill, Hooters, supra note 8. Cahill’s proposition is based on an evaluation of the Hooters restaurant 
chain and the claims of its waitresses that the restaurants had created hostile environment through its name, 
its required uniform, and other sexually charged aspects of its operations. She also limits her claim to the 
employees of the sexy workplace who have sex appeal as a “substantial part” of their particular job. 
However, Cahill’s analysis provides no convincing reason to limit the “assumption of risk” defense in that 
way. 
97 Robert J. Aalberts & Lorne H. Seidman, Sexual Harassment of Employees by Non-Employees: When 
Does the Employer Become Liable?, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 447 (1994). The stricter route of welcomeness 
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reasonably expected sexual harassment, “mid-level risk occupations” (e.g. conventional 
cocktail waitress) would permit attention and occasional inappropriate behavior, and 
“low risk occupations” (e.g. conventional bookstore clerk) would not tolerate any 
harassment.98  
The logic of risk approaches is attractive because they make central respect for 
women’s agency.99 If agency is to mean anything, women must be seen as capable of 
accepting the natural consequences of its exercise. When a woman takes a job at Loews 
Cineplex, she has no reason to believe that she will be subjected to pornographic material 
or conversations, so if she is subjected to them she may have a claim for sexual 
harassment. A woman who takes an equivalent position at Kitty Kat Adult Theater knows 
that pornography is the essence of the business where she is accepting a position and that 
the consumers and her co-workers will likely discuss and joke about the images and 
“dialogue” of the films being shown. She knows she might be forced to watch or 
inadvertently see and hear some of the graphic depictions that define pornography. She 
realizes that the clientele of adult movie theaters is dominated by people interested in the 
kind of behaviors they see in the films. And, she understands, because of those 
circumstances, that some of them may behave towards her in ways that would be 
outlandish in Loews. So, she should bear the consequences of that decision. This logic, 
however, ultimately undermines Title VII’s anti-discrimination objective by categorically 
excluding from its protective sweep entire classes of women, potentially requiring them 
to endure unwanted and degrading conduct based on sex in order to earn a living.  
The assumption of risk theory gives the sexy workplace license to exceed the 
boundaries of the sexual behavior reasonably expected to “come with the territory.”100 
Recall the decisions in Reed and Mangrum discussed above. In some sense, the courts 
found that having opened the door to certain sexual behavior, the women had assumed 
the risk of all other sexual behavior. Is it reasonable to determine that the clerk at the 
adult bookstore or video shop, by agreeing to see, discuss, and stay informed of graphic 
pornography with customers and co-workers, has assumed the risk that her discussion 
will prompt unwanted physical contact? To do so, would crystallize a disregard for the 
rights of individuals and become the equivalent of a “requirement that a man or woman 
run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the privilege of being allowed to work and 
make a living” in the sexy workplace.101 
Aalberts’ and Seidman’s approach is equally flawed in the sexy workplace 
context examined here. Their risk continuum takes into account the expectations of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
analysis implicitly adopts this approach by finding that, having opened the door to certain sexual behavior, 
the women had assumed the risk of other sexual behavior. 
98 Id. at 470-72. 
99 Not everyone feels this intuitive attraction. See, e.g., Burstein, supra note 8, at 306 (“[Accepting the 
assumption of risk theory for Hooters waitresses is] like saying women construction workers assume the 
risk of being harassed when they take a job in construction. The premise of our non-discrimination law is 
that women should not have to choose between having a job and being treated with dignity.”) (quoting 
Deborah Ellis, former legal director of the National Organization for Women Legal Defense Fund). 
100 Although the distinction has not been emphasized here, assumption of the risk approaches to sexual 
harassment tend to be confined to determining employer liability for customer and third party harassment. 
101 Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 
897 (11th Cir. 1892)). 
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employee.102 Of certain behaviors, it allows the employer to defend a sexual harassment 
claim with “well what did she expect.” It avoids the overbreadth of the Cahill assumption 
of the risk approach because it does not deprive certain employees of protection across 
the board; rather, both the nature of the job and the nature of the workplace are taken into 
account. Despite its additional nuance, the Aalberts and Seidman approach creates 
opportunities for abuse in which employers in the sexy workplace could tailor aspects of 
the employment to ratchet up the risk level of the occupation. In general, a technology 
assistant at Playboy may expect a minimum level of sexual content in her day-to-day 
activities. What if the technology department is subsumed in a broader department that 
includes web designers who are responsible for creating the companies pornographic 
internet website? Would this increase the risk of unwelcome sexual content? Moreover, 
the approach, again, requires at least some employees of the sexy workplace (high and 
mid-level risk) to submit to unwanted and possibly degrading conduct based on sex in 
order to earn a living, defeating one of the principal purposes of Title VII.  
The arguments of the proponents of the defenses like the assumption of risk or the 
risk continuum is that the equality afforded by Title VII can only be effectively and 
reasonably achieved if women, viewed as responsible actors, are held accountable for the 
decisions they make. At the other end of the spectrum are those that argue that true 
freedom for women means being able to choose where to work—including sexy 
workplaces—and being ensured equality in that workplace by laws like Title VII. To 
effect this strong protection, such freedom approaches often propose modifications to the 
existing evidentiary standards that loosen the strict requirements. When applied to the 
sexy workplace, such evidentiary modifications replicate the difficulties plaguing the 
prevailing paradigm.  
For example, reasonable woman/victim alternatives posit that women/victims 
experience sexualized behavior distinctly from men/harassers. Such disparate experiences 
of sexualized behavior makes it disingenuous to imagine that there could be a “neutral” 
conception of what any person would consider objectionable or unobjectionable 
sexuality.103 Instead, they suggest a variety of ways the inquiry can be refined to diminish 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 Aalberts & Seidman, supra note 97, at 470 (“[T]he standard applied when non-employees are involved 
must be keyed to the reasonable expectations of the employee in her particular employment 
environment.”). 
103 E.g., Caroline Forell, Essentialism, Empathy, and the Reasonable Woman, 1994 ILL. L. REV. 769, 771-
786 (1994); Robert S. Adler Ellen, The Legal, Ethical, and Social Implications of the “Reasonable 
Woman” Standard in Sexual Harassment Cases, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 773, 774 (1993); Carol Sanger, The 
Reasonable Woman and the Ordinary Man, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1411,1413-17 (1992); Martha Chamallas, 
Feminist Constructions of Objectivity: Multiple Perspectives in Sexual and Racial Harassment Litigation, 1 
TEX. J. OF WOMEN & L. 95, 95 (1992), Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The 
Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1178 (1990). For more detailed 
treatment of the debate, see generally, L. Camille Hebert, Why Don’t “Reasonable Women” Complain 
About Sexual Harassment?, 82 IND. L.J. 711, 742 (2007); Caroline A. Forell & Donna M. Matthews, A 
LAW OF HER OWN: THE REASONABLE WOMAN AS A MEASURE OF MAN 6-7 (2000); Barbara A. Gutek et. 
al., The Utility of the Reasonable Woman Legal Standard in Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment 
Cases: A Multimethod, Multistudy Examination, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 596, 598 (1999); Martha 
Chamallas, Writing About Sexual Harassment: A Guide to the Literature, 4 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 37, 49-52 
(1993). 
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male- or harasser-normativity.104 Modifications of the welcomeness inquiry also seek to 
neutralize superordinate normativity.105 For example, burden-shifting proposals question 
the heteropatriarchal premise,—embedded in the welcomeness inquiry—of women’s 
sexual availability. They recommend the opposite presumption, so “the burden falls on 
the defendant to demonstrate how he knew he was welcome.”106 Likening welcomeness 
to the consent standard in rape law, Estrich proposes that the “doctrinally gratuitous and 
personally humiliating” inquiry be eliminated altogether.107 She recommends, instead, 
that a woman’s subjective experience of harassment be sufficient to establish her case.108  
Notwithstanding their general remedial value, standards like these do little to 
make sexual harassment coverage in the sexy workplace more available, satisfactory, or 
consistent. Reasonability modifications trigger the same “what did you expect” 
perspectives that render risk approaches attractive.109 For example, the sexy workplace 
employees quoted above as cheerfully accepting the harassment concomitant with their 
jobs were women, and by their own accounts, frequently the targets (i.e. victims) of the 
conduct they claimed was not harassment.110 Burden shifting will not make it less 
difficult for a woman to recover because there will still be ample evidence that she did 
welcome the challenged conduct to rebut her showing. Eliminating the welcomeness and 
objectivity analyses leaves in place the significant hurdles of subjectivity and “based on 
sex.” As explained above, in many circumstances, the non-sexualized worker will have 
behaved in ways that will convince a court that she was impervious to the sexually 
charged work environment, and gender discriminatory or discriminating intent is 
particularly difficult to show in the sexy workplace. 
Sex/gender approaches to sexual harassment law fall somewhere between the 
poles represented by the risk and freedom approaches described above. They propose 
shifting the focus of sexual harassment law from pure sexuality, framed as merely 
symptomatic of discrimination, to its underlying causes. Such proposals have the 
potential to capture a broader range of sex discrimination in the sexy workplace. 
Ultimately, they are also problematic because they undermine the foundation of the 
sexual titillation industry.  
For example, Katherine Franke casts sexual harassment as the technology of 
heteropatriarchal subordination and sexism, which constructs and enforces gender 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 For a summary review of the perspectives on which these alternatives rely, see Ann C. McGinley, 
Reasonable Men?, 45 Conn. L. Rev. 1, 34-38 (2012) (suggesting a reasonable man standard for male 
victims of sexual harassment). 
105 See Grace S. Ho, Not Quite Rights: How the Unwelcomeness Element in Sexual Harassment Law 
Undermines Title VII’s Transformative Potential, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 131, 144-48 (2008) (reviewing 
primary proposals on unwelcomeness). 
106 Fitzgerald, et al., supra note 27, at 134. See also Mary F. Radford, By Invitation Only: The Proof of 
Welcomeness in Sexual Harassment Cases, 72 N.C. L. REV. 499, 522-33 (1994) (suggesting burden shifting 
combined with a narrower conception of welcomeness in which “extraneous factors” are excluded from the 
analysis). 
107 Estrich, supra note 21 at 858. 
108 Id. 
109 For a discussion of the reasonable woman standard, see, e.g., Jeremy A. Blumenthal, The Reasonable 
Woman Standard: A Meta-Analytic Review of Gender Differences in Perceptions of Sexual Harassment, 22 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 33, 48 (1998); Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111 Harv. 
L. Rev. 445, 477-83 (1997).  
110 See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text. 
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identities, masculinities, and femininities according to fundamental gender stereotypes of 
male as sexual subject and female as sexual object.111 This concept is plainly 
incompatible with the fundamental nature of the archetypal sexy workplace, the products 
or services of which regulate and enforce just those heteropatriarchal gender norms she 
finds objectionable.  
Vicki Schultz advocates a “sex segregation” approach to sexual harassment, 
whereby women in sex segregated settings would benefit from a presumption that any 
harassment suffered was on the basis of sex and women in integrated environments 
would face, basically, the opposite presumption.112 In a move that seems very beneficial 
to the worker in the sexy workplace, she seeks to take much of the focus off of sexuality 
in the workplace. However, because she promotes a view that “our society needs to 
embrace a new ethics of sexuality,”113Schultz’s sex segregation approach would have the 
strange effect of dealing a significant blow to the sex in the industry. Not only are many 
of these workplaces segregated, but they are necessarily so.114 For example, the result of 
the bona fide occupational qualification exception—accepted for strippers on the grounds 
that only women provide the titillation service effectively—means that there can be 
pervasive sex segregation in a strip club. Of course, then, the standard for proving sexual 
harassment would be lower in the sexy workplace, and under Schultz’s own argument, 
difficulties would rise. Either the sexy workplace would seek to “sanitize” itself by 
limiting the sex-related conduct that would be permitted, or it would eliminate the 
segregated nature of the environment. Either way, many sexy workplaces could not 
continue to provide their services or products in the way that has made those businesses 
successful. Even if these strange effects did not result, the worker in the sexy workplace 
would still be required to prove at least some of the most difficult elements of the hostile 
environment claim, namely that it was unwelcome.115 In the case of non-sexual 
harassment this may not present a large problem, but if the claim were based primarily on 
sexual conduct, the plaintiff would face all difficulties described above.  
Putting aside the general merits of the Schultz and Franke proposals, it is clear 
that they would not work as they envision for the employee in the sexy workplace. It is 
possible to continue to identify how theoretical and doctrinal reformations of sexual 
harassment law are incapable of providing stable groundwork from which to attack 
sexual harassment in the sexy workplace. However, this brief survey suggests that there 
is no holistic approach that adequately accounts for the unique position of the sexy 
workplace.116  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 See also Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of 
Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1995)(providing sustained analysis of the deficiencies of the 
sex-gender dichotomy). 
111 Id. at 762-71. See also Katherine M. Franke, Putting Sex to Work, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 1139 (1998) 
(expanding the technology as sexism argument). 
112 Schultz, supra note 72, at 2176. 
113 Id. at 2167. 
114 For a critique of this legal assumption, see Katharine T. Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes: Dress and 
Appearance Standards, Community Norms, And Workplace Equality, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 2541, 2579 (1994). 
115 Schultz, supra note 72, at 2175-76.  
116 The author recognizes that the preceding review of alternatives was incomplete and may have glossed 
over some of the nuances in each commentator’s approach. However, it adequately paints a general picture 
of some pertinent parts of a vast body of proposals for the reform of sexual harassment law, which suffices 
for the present discussion. 
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B. The Bona Fide Occupational Requirement: A Good Approach? 
There is something about the sexy workplace that makes it difficult to distill an 
approach that might be appropriate for the workplace in general. The basic problem is 
that society has conflicting intuitions about the law and the sexy workplace. On the one 
hand, the sexy workplace, as stated above, fits (or, rather, is) the classic example of a 
hostile work environment—so permeated by sexual innuendo and vulgarity that it affects 
every aspect of one’s job. But on the other hand, not all sexy workplaces need to or do 
conform to this standard idea. There is a nearly universal perception of the sexy 
workplace based on the nature of the sexual titillation industry that it is per force an 
atmosphere rife with the sort of behaviors and beliefs against which the law has pitted 
itself. Even without explicit sexuality, people in the business of selling sex—sex that 
frequently displays or suggests (in words, pictures, or games) violence towards women, 
submissiveness of women, dehumanization of women—are seen to adopt the attitudes 
their products are said to promote. When a worker in the sexual titillation industry—
normally assumed to be a stripper or a performer in pornography—is mistreated or 
harassed, it is seen as the natural and foreseeable result of having made the decision to 
work there. In short, the sexy workplace and its employees are very unsympathetic 
litigants.  
On the other hand, the limits to these “un-sympathies” are palpable. The sex 
titillation industry may widely be seen as unsavory, but it is also very popular. Many (if 
not most) Americans disagree with the radical feminist position that pornography is, by 
its very nature, discriminatory and, to a certain extent, respect the freedom of people to 
make their livings through sex and to be consumers of the products and services provided 
by the titillation industry. In the same way, few would argue that workers in these 
industries have placed themselves in such a vulnerable position that they must accept the 
entire menu of objectionable and criminal behavior. 
The problem, then, is determining how to square these competing views within 
one test for any Title VII violation, particularly hostile environment sexual harassment. 
Ultimately, there is no way to adequately account for the entire sexual titillation industry 
within the Title VII framework, which incontestably seeks to “guarantee women and men 
equal work roles.”117 The best way, however, to narrow the inevitable gaps in protection 
for victims of harassment in the sexy workplace is to modify the current three-part test 
for hostile work environment by addressing the concerns highlighted by the proponents 
of alternative models discussed above.  
1. Unwelcomeness Revisited 
As demonstrated above, current tests of the unwelcomeness standard would place 
upon the worker in the sexy workplace an undue, possibly impossible, burden of non-
sexualized conduct if she seeks to maintain Title VII protection. To account for the 
sexually charged nature of the sexy workplace, it would make sense to differentiate 
between work-related and non-work-related workplace conduct. The examination of a 
worker’s conduct exhibiting welcomeness to non-work-related behavior would be limited 
to her own non-work related behavior. So, if an employee discusses sex in general or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 Schultz, supra note 72, at 2131. 
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personally or is otherwise “provocative” in connection with her work responsibilities, that 
work-related conduct would not be evidence that she welcomed any other sexual conduct. 
In other words, if the defendant mounts a defense of welcomeness, there must be a clear 
nexus between the conduct of the plaintiff and the alleged harassment. 
This bifurcated examination would also be limited by a rule of construction 
requiring courts to interpret welcomeness narrowly and unwelcomeness broadly. In other 
words, any manifestation that certain behaviors are welcome should be limited to the 
narrow set of circumstances in which that behavior occurs. Conversely, courts must 
presumptively consider a women’s expression of unwelcomeness to be a general 
assertion that sexual (or other improper) behavior is unwanted. This means that a woman 
like the victim in Mangrum118 cannot be determined to welcome sexual invites if her 
behavior was limited to back scratching. And, her statements like “not right now,” would 
be construed to indicate a general expression of unwelcomeness to continued or further 
sexual conduct. 
It may be appropriate to refine the bifurcated approach using principles derived 
from discrimination law. In particular, the bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) 
exception permitted in Title VII provides a useful framework for determining how courts 
should distinguish between work-related and non-work-related conduct. 
The sex BFOQ exception, which must be interpreted narrowly,119 permits 
employers to discriminate intentionally in employment decision-making “in those certain 
circumstances where . . . sex . . . is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably 
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.”120 To that 
end, in International Union v. Johnson Controls,121 the Supreme Court promulgated the 
“essence of the business” test to determine whether an employer could shield itself from 
Title VII with a sex BFOQ: based on a reasonable factual inquiry, the essence of the 
business must be undermined by non-discriminatory behavior. Subsequent developments 
in sex discrimination jurisprudence have made it clear that this test requires courts to 
determine the “primary function” or “main duties” of a business,122 focusing either on the 
business as a whole123 or on the particular job being performed.124 The BFOQ is used as a 
justification for single-sex hiring in various areas including hospitals, strip clubs, 
penitentiaries, and the performing arts. 
Translated into the hostile environment harassment context, the BFOQ would 
become an exception for bona fide occupational requirements—the BFOR. In order to 
claim the exception, the employer would have to show first that the essence of its 
business, in general, was sexual titillation. Doc Johnson Sextoys, Hustler XXX, Kitty Kat 
Adult Theater, and Flashdancers Gentlemen’s Club would likely pass this threshold test, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.  
119 Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333-334 (1977); Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a) (2004). 
120 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1). 
121 499 U.S. 187 (1991). 
122 Katherine Kruse, The Inequality Approach and the BFOQ: Use of Feminist Theory to Reinterpret the 
Title VII BFOQ Exception, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 261, 277 (1993). 
123 Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 404 U.S. 950 (1971) 
(holding that the essence of an airline was providing air travel, not sympathy or reassurance). 
124 Wilson v. Southwest Airlines 517 F. Supp. 292, 302 (1981) (finding that the essence of the position of 
flight attendant was not sexual titillation). 
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while the Hooters restaurants, Dirty Girls Housekeeping,125 and even Playboy magazine, 
based on its self-professed image as a men’s magazine comparable to Esquire, GQ, or 
Maxim,126 might not.  
Second, the employer would have to show that the primary function of the job or 
the main duties of the employee necessitated each category of conduct—vulgar speech, 
display of pornographic images, sexual innuendo, etc.—included in the complaint. The 
fact finder would then disregard those categories related to the essence of the business, 
evaluating the claim only on the evidence of non-work-related behavior. The “creative 
necessity” defense claimed by Warner Brothers in Lyle v. Warner Bros.,127 looks very 
similar to the BFOR contemplated here. There, a female writer’s assistant for the then-
popular situation comedy, Friends, claimed that the writers created a hostile environment 
by making lewd, crude, vulgar jokes while discussing ideas for story lines, jokes, and 
dialog for the show. Warner Brothers claimed and a California court implicitly agreed 
that sexual innuendo and vulgarity unrelated to the show formed part of the nature of the 
writers’ work requiring their assistant or scribe to endure it because “the show revolved 
around a group of young, sexually active adults, featured adult-oriented sexual humor, 
and typically relied on sexual and anatomical language, innuendo, wordplay, and physical 
gestures to convey its humor.”128.  
The business necessity defense (BND) supplies another refinement of the 
bifurcation concept. Under the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Title VII in Griggs v. 
Duke Power Co., employers are allowed to maintain facially neutral policies that have a 
discriminatory disparate impact only if the policy has a “manifest relationship to the 
employment in question.”129 Lower courts have supplemented that basic condition with 
the requirements that the policy serve a “compelling need”130 and that there are “no 
acceptable alternative policies or practices”131 that would avoid or minimize the disparate 
impact. Adding the additional stricture of the BND to the BFOR would make explicit the 
need for employers to have considered ways to eliminate the harassing conduct before 
determining that it was part of the essence of the business. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 Dirty Girls Housekeeping (http://dirtygirlshousekeeping.com) is an example of the latest in “sex-plus” 
business endeavors. Such companies provide traditional, topless, and nude housekeeping services. Another 
such business was Hooters’ short-lived Hooters Air. Rather than market its flight attendants as providing 
sexual titillation, which was found inconsistent with Title VII in Wilson, Hooters’ airline sent two of the 
restaurants waitresses on each flight to chat and play games with passengers. See Sean Daly, Leave It to 
Cleavage: The Restaurant that Serves Titillation with its Burgers takes to the Skies with Hooters Air, 
Nonstop to Myrtle Beach, THE WASHINGTON POST, June 25, 2003, at C02. 
126 See PLAYBOY ENTERPRISES, ANNUAL REPORT, at 8 (March 12, 2010) (describing the domestic 
publication as a “general-interest magazine, targeted to men, with a reputation for excellence founded on its 
high-quality photography, entertainment, humor, cartoons and articles on current issues, interests and 
trends. Playboy magazine consistently includes in-depth, candid interviews with high-profile political, 
business, entertainment and sports figures, pictorials of famous women, content by leading authors, and the 
work of top photographers, writers and artists. Playboy magazine also features lifestyle articles on 
consumer electronics and other products, fashion and automobiles and covers the worlds of sports and 
entertainment.”). 
127 Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Prods., 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 511, 512 (Ct. App. 2004) review granted and 
opinion superseded sub nom. Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Prod., 94 P.3d 476 (Cal. 2004). 
128 Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Prods., 132 P.3d 211, 215 (2006). 
129 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). See also EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (c) (2004). 
130 See, e.g., Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, Inc., 834 F.2d 697, 701 (8th Cir. 1987). 
131 See, e.g., Lyle, 412 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 520 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Concisely, the BFOR/BND exception suggested here means that if an employee 
can perform the job in dispute or properly carry out the functions of the business without 
sexual conduct, then the exception does not apply.132 Of course, no real world 
circumstances would lend themselves to analysis under a rule read so rigidly. It is 
probably more precisely stated as follows: if an employee cannot perform the job in 
dispute or properly carry out the functions of the business without the particular sexual 
conduct, then that conduct is work-related and must be excluded from the determination 
of the employee’s Title VII claim. Defined in this way, the BFOR/BND exception serves 
both employers and employees because the conduct excluded as work-related could also 
not be used against the woman claiming sexual harassment.  
2. Severe and Pervasive Revisited 
The BFOR/BND exception would result in a simpler modification of the “severe 
or pervasive” prong of the hostile environment analysis. The most difficult aspect of that 
analysis was the assumption that certain activities cannot be said to be objectively or 
subjectively severe or pervasive enough to constitute a hostile environment if one works 
in a sexy workplace, so the standards of severity are inherently raised. This impossibility 
is an unavoidable difficulty for the worker in the sexy workplace, which is necessarily 
integrated into the BFOR/BND paradigm. Its debilitating effect, however, can be 
mitigated by clarifying that the higher standard applies only to work-related conduct—
conduct manifestly related to the essence of the business and the job. So, a copy editor at 
Swank magazine may be required to look at graphic photos and hear graphic language but 
only within the scope of her employment. By contrast, if business meetings or outings are 
always held, for no purpose, at a local topless bar, the analysis of whether the conduct 
was sufficient to create a hostile environment should be conducted as if she did not work 
in the sexy workplace. 
Simply, the BFOR/BND exception allows employers operating sexy workplaces 
to insulate themselves from liability for the sexual behavior absolutely necessary to or 
inherent in the normal functioning of a business in the sexual titillation industry. It 
redefines harassment such that work-related conduct, within this small subset of cases, 
does not and cannot be harassment. But outside of the narrowly defined work context, the 
bifurcated approach gives non-sexualized sexy workplace employees the level of Title 
VII protection to which other women are entitled.133 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 Rachel L. Cantor, Consumer Preferences for Sex and Title VII: Employing Market Definition Analysis 
for Evaluating BFOQ Defenses, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 493, 499 (1999). 
133 Ann McGinley seems to suggest, without elaboration, a similar approach to workers in sexualized 
workplaces. As she explains, “If the employer in a sexualized environment has explicitly or implicitly 
communicated to its employees that certain customer behavior and environmental conditions are necessary 
to the job performed and relate to the essence of the business, and the employees agree, these behaviors and 
conditions form part of the terms or conditions of employment in the workplace, and cannot create a legally 
cognizable hostile working environment.” Ann C. McGinley, Harassment of Sex(y) Workers: Applying 
Title VII to Sexualized Industries, 18 Yale J.L. & Feminism 65, 108 (2006). Of course, it is readily accepted 
that both the protection offered by the bifurcated approach suggested here and the more ad hoc analysis 
proposed by McGinley fall short of the mark. But the goal here is to reduce the disparate treatment of non-
sexualized workers in the sexy workplace, not reform the all sexual harassment jurisprudence. 
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3. Because of Sex Revisited 
The bifurcated approach contemplated by the BFOR/BND exception must be 
bolstered by a modification of the “because of sex” test. As has been argued elsewhere, 
with respect to this prong of the hostile environment analysis, more evenly distributing 
the burdens of proof would improve the ability of the plaintiff to establish this element.  
Under the approach suggested here, the plaintiff would have to come forward 
with some credible evidence that the requirement was met, even if that evidence would 
not necessarily be sufficient to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the “because of 
sex” element. Then, the burden shifts to the defendant, not to disprove the plaintiff’s 
claim but to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the conduct was based on 
other factors.  
This adaptation of the “because of sex” requirement would certainly have salutary 
effects within the general hostile work environment framework, and it need not be limited 
to the sexy workplace subset. In particular, the proposed change might create more 
favorable prospects for victims of same-sex harassment than has been left for them by 
Oncale.134 Regardless of the accuracy of the claim to its broader utility, the diluted 
burden shift proposed here would temper the severity of the loss of favored status many 
non-sexualized employees would face in bringing a Title VII action solely because of the 
nature of the sexy workplace.135 
4. The Bifurcated Approach in Context 
These modifications take into account the concerns suggested in the alternatives 
discussed above. Consideration is given to the responsibility of individuals working in 
the sexy workplace, so they cannot expect a sex-free environment. The approach also 
takes an important step towards the construction of a reasonable mechanism for providing 
comparable protection from “because of sex” harassment to all women, no matter where 
they work.  
What is more, the BFOR/BND exception provides a framework applicable to both 
employee and customer behavior. Recall, for example, the waitress in Schonauer.136 The 
facts of that case reveal that Fox’s Topless Entertainment, where Schonauer worked, was 
a fairly lowbrow establishment, and it is easy to imagine the bar’s patrons behaving 
raucously, making lewd gestures and remarks. One might even imagine some of those 
remarks or gestures, especially on Mondays, when waitresses were expected to perform 
nude, might be directed toward Schonauer even if she never performed. In that case, the 
employer could argue that maintaining a rowdy atmosphere where customers felt free to 
direct sexual jokes toward the staff was part of its business. It could also argue that some 
such behavior was inherent to nude dancing and that there was no policy it could enforce 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 Oncale seems to eliminate the only sexual harassment theories—notably, harassment based on gender 
stereotyping—under which same-sex plaintiff’s had been successful where the harasser was not 
homosexual. See Nailah A. Jaffree, Halfway out of the Closet: Oncale’s Limitations in Protecting 
Homosexual Victims of Sex Discrimination, 54 FL. L. REV. 799, 822-23 (2002); David S. Schwartz, When 
is Sex Because of Sex? The Causation Problem in Sexual Harassment Law, 150 U. PENN. L. REV. 1697, 
1747 (2002). Cf. Kathryn Abrams, Postscript, Spring 1998: A Response to Professors Bernstein and 
Franke, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1257, 1259 (1998). 
135 See Part II(A) supra.  
136 See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.  
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that would suppress the conduct. For more aggressive behavior, like touching or stalking, 
it may be harder to maintain that a lowbrow strip club could not exist without such 
behavior.137 Under the same test, however, Fox’s Topless Entertainment could not argue 
that employees pressuring waitresses, hired with no expectations to perform nude, to 
provide intimate sexual information and participate in the revue was necessary to its 
business. Neither could it successfully maintain that allowing manager access to dressing 
rooms was so connected with the business or the job as to form part of its essence.  
While the proposed changes improve upon the current hostile environment 
framework, the resulting model is imperfect. It borrows its main principles from a 
standard—the “essence of the business”—that courts have been notoriously inconsistent 
in applying. It provides more protection to workers in least sexy workplaces than in the 
sexiest workplaces—the more sexualized the particular workplace, the more conduct is 
excludable under the BFOR/BND exception. Further, it inherently differentiates between 
the level of sexual conduct related to the job. The Hustler magazine editor is likely less 
protected than the Hustler secretary.  
There is no reason, however, to believe that these differences in protection 
actually track the actual need for protection and actual experiences of harassment by 
individuals working in the sexy workplace. Yet, to take the opposite approach would 
negate the assumption made in the foregoing discussion, as well as in the law, that the 
sexy workplace does not violate Title VII per se.  
Ultimately, there is no “good” approach to hostile environment sexual harassment 
in the sexy workplace. The changes suggested here, however, soften the harsh light that 
Bartlett’s rule of thumb shed upon the law and the sexy workplace. Under the current 
approach, “the rule of thumb at end of the day is simple: sex bars can subordinate 
women, but airlines and restaurants may not.”138 As modified, the rule of thumb becomes 
this: sex bars can subordinate women (but only slightly), but airlines and restaurants may 
not. 
The easiest response to this admission is to embrace a refrain sounding throughout 
sexual harassment discourse: law is an inherently inadequate, inappropriate, or limited 
tool for the type of social change that would be necessary to address the sexy workplace 
problem and other issues that plague the hostile environment paradigm in theory and in 
practice. The response adopted here, however, is to view the intractability of sexual 
harassment problems as suggesting the potential for further analysis. 
III. IMPLICATIONS AND RESEARCH AGENDA 
This article began with a narrative about the non-sexy worker in the sexy 
workplace. But from a conventional legal perspective, the immediate practical relevance 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 Even if that claim were true, those behaviors, as well as certain obscene behaviors (like masturbation in 
public) are, generally, illegal. Obviously, no business could maintain that it was required to permit illegal 
behavior. Those customer acts would fall, clearly within the range of non-work-related conduct for which 
the employer would be held liable according to the current standards set forth in Faragher v. City of Boca 
Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (discussing employer liability generally), and cases like EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 
507 F. Supp. 599, 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) and EEOC Guidelines 29 CFR § 1604.11(e) (employer may be 
responsible for acts of non-employee where the employer knows or should have known of the conduct and 
fails to take remedial action). 
138 Bartlett, supra note 111. 
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of the discussion that followed is limited. The reason for this rather incongruous 
pronouncement is not that the sex titillation industry, on which this article is focused, is 
not very important. Some estimates conclude that Americans spend as much as 14 billion 
dollars139 a year on “hard-core videos, peep shows, live sex acts, adult cable 
programming, sexual devices, computer porn, and sex magazines.”140 More public forms 
of adult entertainment like strip clubs, pornography theaters, and gentlemen’s clubs have 
also increased in popularity, as evidenced not only by the reports of people in and around 
the industry—one gentlemen’s club founder described ideal customer as a “high-powered 
attorney who needed some safe way to recharge his batteries”141—but also in the 
significant number of sexual harassment cases predicated, in part, on the use of these 
venues for business purposes.142 Sexual titillation is big business, and it cannot survive 
without the services of non-sexualized employees. Someone has to answer the phones, 
package the products, sell the tickets, rent out the videos, serve the drinks, write the 
HTML code, inspect the merchandise, clean up after the show, and do all of the tasks the 
essence of which is not sex. Those people cannot be the dancers, the “bunnies,” the 
“pets,” and the film performers—at least, not always.  
The limited application of this article’s doctrinal insight is not the result of the 
illusory nature of the problem posed. The real issue is this: despite its rapid and continual 
growth and the mainstreaming and social acceptance of its products and services, the 
sexual titillation industry has been and continues to be insulated from formalized legal 
mechanisms. The BFOQ exception, permitting sexy workplaces to discriminate in hiring, 
is just one example of the liberty that comes with selling sex.143 But, there are other 
examples, as well.  
Strip clubs and other establishments offering live adult entertainment cut 
themselves off from many of the regulations between themselves and their sexualized 
employees by labeling those workers “independent contractors,” thereby creating barriers 
to the scope of legal liability an establishment might incur.144 Most important, however, 
there is still a social and legal stigma attached to the sexual titillation industry making it 
difficult for workers—sexualized and non-sexualized alike—to utilize the mechanisms 
available to regulate employment conditions. “The borderline-legal status of the industry 
makes many . . . reluctant to seek redress,”145 and as a result of these realities, individuals 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 Dennis McAlpine, American Porn, FRONTLINE, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/porn/interviews/mcalpine.html (last visited September 23, 
2013) (estimating between one and 14 billion dollars in porn-related profits). 
140 Rutman, supra note 8, at 516. 
141 Burstein, supra note 8, at 273. 
142 See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Custom Companies, Inc., No. 02 C 3768, 2004 WL 765891, (N.D.Ill. Apr. 07, 
2004); Dickerson v. SecTek, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d 66 (D.D.C. 2002); Jones v. Rent a Ctr., Inc., No. 01-
2320-CM, 2002 WL 924833 (D. Kan. May 02, 2002); Pilla v. Delaware River Port Auth., No. CIV. A. 98-
5723, 1999 WL 345918, (E.D.Pa., May 07, 1999); Maldonado v. Esmor Corr. Servs., Inc., No. 97 CIV. 
7087 (HB), 1998 WL 516118, (S.D.N.Y. Aug 19, 1998); Chisholm v. Foothill Capital Corp., 3 F. Supp. 2d 
925 (N.D. Ill. 1998); Dorn v. Astra U.S., Inc., No. CIV. 96-11124-MEL, 1997 WL 258491 (D. Mass. Apr 
02, 1997).  
143 See Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 301 (N.D. Tex. 1981); Guardian Capital Corp. 
v. N.Y. State Div. of Human Rights, 46 A.D.2d 832, 937 (N.Y. App. Div.). 
144 Rutman, supra note 8, at 520-552.  
145 Eric Schlosser, The Business of Pornography: Who’s Making the Money?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., 
Feb. 10, 1997, at 47. 
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working in the sexy workplace do not bring sexual harassment claims at the rate of their 
peers in non-sexualized workplaces.146 A cluster of claims by non-sexualized employees 
against Larry Flynt Publications Inc., the publisher of Hustler Magazine, may indicate a 
change in the trend.147 Until such a change, however, there will be little doctrinal value of 
the concrete suggestions proffered in this paper—one cannot use legal theories without 
cases in which to apply them. Nevertheless, the narrow discussion of the difficulties 
faced by non-sexualized workers in businesses selling sex has broader implications that 
raise important questions about the nature of sexual harassment under Title VII. It seems 
appropriate, now, to ground the claims made throughout this article in their significance, 
not only for the law of sexual harassment more generally, but also for all laws seeking to 
transform society in emancipatory ways. 
In Thoreson, the court noted that “[a]nti-discrimination laws are designed to 
eliminate the misguided notion that fundamental rights and liberties of certain classes of 
people need not be respected. The resulting harm to society inheres in the potential 
creation or perpetuation of a subclass . . . denied the means to participate equally in the 
social order.”148 But many more courts have emphasized that this provision of equal 
opportunities for women and other protected classes does not mean that Title VII was 
“designed to bring about a magical transformation in the social mores of American 
workers.”149  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 In the nine-year germination of the ideas explored in the article, there have been only two reported cases 
of a non-sexy worker in the sexy workplace. As discussed above, the first involved conduct that also 
consituted quid pro quo demands of sexual (or sexualized) activity, and the second did not decide the 
merits of the case, and the persistent behavior of which the plaintiff complained also constituted quid pro 
quo demands of sexualized activity. See Schonauer v. DCR Entertainment, Inc., 905 P.2d 392 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 1995). The most recent sexy workplace case is both unpublished and non-citable, and its analysis of 
sexual harassment law was not dispositive of the case. See Raymond, supra note 4. An additional complaint 
was filed arising out of substantially similar facts of Raymond. See Oldham v. Flynt, 2006 WL 4664720 
(Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. Jun. 6, 2006), other than the fact that Oldham was required by a California 
court to arbitrate her claim, Oldham v. Flynt, B195911, 2008 WL 4276535 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 18, 2008), 
the final outcome and status of this dispute are unknown. However, according to media reports the initial 
arbitration award was granted in favor of Flynt denying Oldham’s sexual harassment claims. 
http://www.mercurynews.com/california/ci_20038847. The outcome and status of a third complaint filed 
against Hustler (this time for conduct of Larry’s daughter, Theresa Flynt), see Prescott v. Flynt, 2011 WL 
2590627 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. July 1, 2001), is also unknown. Media sources have reported a 
number of allegations too, though whether they materialized into legal complaints is unclear. In total, there 
are fewer than ten reports of such harassment from any source. An increasing number of sexual harassment 
cases involving sexy workers are being reported in the media. For example, a legal columnist who modeled 
nude for the magazine filed suit against Playboy. See Fetman v Playboy, 2009 WL 4074321 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 
9, 2009). And at least one California and one New York law firm are touting expertise in strip club sexual 
harassment cases. See http://www.exoticdancerrights.com/stripper-sexual-harassment.html; 
http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/strippers-flocking-matthew-blit-sexual-harassment-lawsuits-
article-1.165503. 
147 See Reuters, Larry Flynt Sued for Washing Sex Toys, BOSTON.COM (Aug. 6, 2003), 
http://www.boston.com/news/daily/06/odds_flynt.htm; Laura Wides, Hustler Magnate Enters Governor's 
Race, U-T SAN DIEGO (Aug. 5, 2003), http://legacy.utsandiego.com/news/politics/recall/20030804-1654-
ca-recall-flynt.html. 
148 Thoreson v. Penthouse Intern., Ltd., 563 N.Y.S.2d 968, 975 (N.Y. Sup. 1990). 
149 Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620-621 (6th Cir. 1986) (“[I]t cannot seriously be 
disputed that in some work environments, humor and language are rough hewn and vulgar. Sexual jokes, 
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The case of the sexy workplace demonstrates that the latter claim is not true. To 
the extent that Title VII is supposed to provide an equal opportunity and freedom from 
discrimination in the workplace, it must also change the social mores of the American 
workforce. The task of Title VII, like so much other civil rights law, is to transform, not 
reflect, the underlying belief systems and behaviors of society. 
This observation helps explain why the sexy workplace is not easily amenable to 
either the judicial versions of the Title VII analysis or any of the analyses proposed in 
academia. It is, in many respects, the embodiment of the mores sought to be changed by 
anti-discrimination law. As a whole, the sex titillation industry is characterized by strict, 
hierarchical sex segregation, the objectification and exploitation of women, and the 
reinforcement of certain sex stereotypes.150 
  Since this tension cannot be reconciled, it is impossible to develop a test or 
analytical framework that adequately accounts for: (1) the unique situation of the sexy 
workplace as bastion of what Title VII stands against; (2) the general principles 
protecting individuals from sexual harassment in other fields; and (3) the acceptance of 
the sexual titillation industry as a legitimate presence. The only way to resolve the 
conflict is to recognize that the sexy workplace, as it is popularly conceived, is by its very 
nature a violation of Title VII. The basic idea is that a woman cannot be treated fairly and 
equally at work—the goal of Title VII—if her co-workers and employer have stereotyped 
views of gender roles and the status of women. To the extent that the sexy workplace 
perpetuates such views in its operation, products, and services, it infringes the law. The 
violation is most powerful from a teleological perspective, but it is also normatively in 
breach. The purpose of Title VII may have been the rather immeasurable goal of 
equalizing employment opportunities for men and women and other protected groups, but 
it does this by prohibiting discrimination. When employers do not check the expression 
of stereotypes but promote or operate according to them, they violate Title VII. 
Of course, recognizing the incompatibility of the sexy workplace with Title VII 
cannot be equated with support for that position. Realizing that Title VII was meant to 
fundamentally alter the social mores of society does not mean that one cannot challenge 
the extent to which the law should be allowed to do this. It may be that the law can only 
have limited influence over certain basic aspects of an individual’s moral code. 
Moreover, other values, like the freedom of speech, are implicated in the decision to 
legislate the moral code. Conversely, it may be that the only way the basic rights 
enshrined in the constitution can be promoted is through laws aimed at affecting our 
social mores. The discussion of sex in the sexy workplace encourages a fuller 
examination of this final question: if “Title VII affords employees the right to work in an 
environment free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult,”151 should the 
law permit business endeavors which, by their very nature, hinder the full realization of 
that right? If the answer is yes, what higher value—higher than equality—is being 
pursued by that policy? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
sexual conversations and girlie magazines may abound. Title VII was not meant to—or can—change 
this.”). 
150 There are other descriptors of the sexual titillation industry, and there is no consensus about whether 
these characteristics are necessary to the industry. Nonetheless, they stand out as central to the industry, as 
a whole, as it exists today. 
151 Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986). 
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Seen in this way, sexual harassment law becomes as important for the people who 
do not “use it” as it is for those who do.  
